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En este valioso libro, Berwick y Chomsky 
se ocupan una vez más de la perspectiva 
biolingüística del lenguaje en donde se lo 
considera como un objeto particular del mundo 
biológico. Nuestros autores argumentan que esta 
versión simplificada de la gramática universal 
es lo que le habría permitido a los primeros 
humanos hacer el salto evolutivo de criaturas 
sin lenguaje a los seres locuaces del Paleolítico 
Superior, hace unos 40.000 años. Esto, a su vez, 
habría resultado en la rica explosión cultural no 
anunciada alrededor de ese tiempo, incluyendo 
arte rupestre, joyería y entierros rituales. Dicho 
argumento se sustenta de la siguiente manera: 
Como nuestra capacidad para la gramática está 
programada genéticamente, y como ninguna otra 
especie tiene lenguaje (i.e. Faculty of language), 
es lógico pensar que el lenguaje surgió de manera 
“Language, more than anything else, is what makes us human”
T.F.
bastante repentina, de una sola vez, debido a una 
mutación aleatoria. Esto es lo que los autores se 
refieren como la "opinión del ojo del jugador" en 
contraste con un "ojo del gene" de la evolución. 
La repentina aparición del lenguaje se produjo 
quizás hace no más de 80.000 años, justo antes 
de que los humanos modernos participaran en 
una dispersión fuera de África. El comentario y 
proyecciones de las tesis soportadas en el libro se 
presentan en la siguiente reseña elaborada por 
uno de los representantes de la biolingüística, el 
profesor Marc Hauser.
Berwick & Chomsky’s Why only us (2016)
Challenges to the what, when, and why?
Why only us [WOU] is a wonderful, slim, 
engaging, and clearly written book by Robert 
Berwick and Noam Chomsky.  From the authors’ 
perspective, it is a book about language and 
evolution. And of course it is.  However, I think 
it is actually about something much bigger.  It 
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is an argument about the evolution of thought 
itself, with language being not only one form of 
thought, but a domain that can impact thought 
itself, in ways that are truly unique in the animal 
kingdom.  Seen in this light, WOU provides a 
framework for thinking about the evolution of 
thought and a challenge to Darwin’s claim that 
the human mind is only quantitatively different 
from other animals. Since this is an idea that I 
have championed (Hauser, 2009), I am of course 
a bit partial! Let me unpack all of this by working 
through Berwick and Chomsky’s arguments, 
especially those where we don’t quite agree. 
One caveat up front: as I have written before, 
including with Berwick and Chomsky (Hauser 
et al., 2014), I am not convinced that the ideas 
put forward here or in WOU are testable: animal 
capacities are far too impoverished to shed any 
comparative light on the evolution of human 
language, and the hominid fossil record is either 
silent or too recent to be of interest. My goal 
here, therefore, is to focus on the fascinating 
ideas raised in WOU, leaving to the side how 
or whether such ideas might be confronted by 
significant empirical tests. 
One of the essential moves in WOU is to 
argue that MERGE —the simplest recursive 
operation— is the bedrock of our capacity for 
infinite expression by finite means, one that 
generates hierarchical structure. Because no 
other animal has MERGE, and because MERGE 
is simple and the essence of language, the 
evolutionary process may well have occurred 
rapidly, appearing suddenly in only one species: 
modern humans or Homo sapiens sapiens (Hss). 
To accept this argument, you have to accept at 
least five premises:
1. MERGE is the essence of language
2. No other animal has MERGE
3. No other hominid has MERGE
4. Due to the simplicity of MERGE, it could evolve 
quickly, perhaps due to mutation
5. Because you either have or don’t have MERGE 
(there is no demi-MERGE), there is no option for 
proto-language.
I accept 2 because the comparative literature 
shows nothing remotely like MERGE.  Whether 
one looks at data from natural communication, 
artificial language learning experiments, or 
animal training studies with human language or 
language-like tokens, there is simply no evidence 
of anything remotely recursive. As Berwick 
and Chomsky note, the closest one gets is the 
combinatoric gymnastics observed in birdsong, 
but these are neither recursive nor do they 
generate hierarchical structures that shape or 
generate the variety of meaningful expressions 
observed in all human languages. 
I also accept 3, though here we don’t really 
have the evidence to say one way or the other, 
and even if we did, and it turned out that say 
Neanderthals had MERGE, it wouldn’t really 
make much of a difference to the argument. 
That is, the fossil record for Neanderthal, though 
richer than we once thought, says nothing about 
recursive operations, and nor for that matter 
does the fossil record for Hss. Both records show 
interesting signs of creative thought —a topic to 
which I return— but nothing that would indicate 
recursive thought or expression. If evidence 
emerges that Neanderthals had MERGE that 
would simply push back the date of origin for 
Berwick and Chomsky’s evolutionary account, 
without changing the core details.    
Let’s turn to 1, 4 and 5 then. What is 
interesting about the core argument in WOU 
is that although Berwick and Chomsky place 
significant emphasis on MERGE, they fully 
acknowledge that the recursive machinery 
must interface with the Conceptual -Intensional 
system on the one hand, and with the Sensory-
Motor system on the other.  However, once one 
acknowledges the non-trivial roles of CI, SM, 
and the interfaces, while also recognizing the 
unique properties of each of these systems, it 
is no longer possible to accept premise 4, and 
challenges arise for premise 5.  This analysis lays 
open the door to some fascinating possibilities, 
many of which might be explored empirically. I 
consider a few next.
Berwick and Chomsky devote some of the 
early material of WOU to review work on vocal 
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imitation in songbirds, including comparative 
genetic and neurobiological data. In some ways, 
the songbird system is a lovely example because 
the work is exquisitely detailed and shows 
some nice parallels with our own.  In particular, 
songbirds learn their song in some of the 
same ways as young children learn language, 
including evidence of an innate system that 
constrains both the timing and material 
acquired.  However, there are elements of the 
songbird system that are strikingly different 
from our own, not mentioned in WOU, but when 
acknowledged, tell an even more interesting tale 
about the evolution of Hss — one that is at the 
same time supportive of the uniqueness claims 
in WOU while also raising questions about the 
nature of the uniqueness claim. Specifically, 
the songbird system is a striking example of 
extreme modularity.  The capacity of a songbird 
to imitate or learn its species-specific song is not 
a capacity that extends to other calls in its vocal 
repertoire, nor to any visual display. That is, a 
songbird can imitate the song material it hears, 
but nothing else.  Not so for our species, where 
the capacity to imitate is amodal, or at least 
bimodal, with sounds and actions copied readily, 
and from birth. This disconnect from sensory 
modality is a trademark of human thought, and 
of course, is a critical feature of our language 
faculty:  at virtually all levels of detail, including 
syntax, semantics, phonology, acquisition, and 
pragmatics, there are no differences between 
signed and spoken languages. No other animal 
is like this. Whether we observe songbirds, 
dolphins, or non-human primates, an individual 
born deaf does not emerge with a comparably 
expressive visual system of communication. 
The systems of communicative expression 
are intimately tied to the modality, such that 
if one modality is damaged, other modalities 
are incapable of picking up the tab. The fact 
that our language, and even more broadly, 
our thoughts, are detached from modality, 
suggests a fundamental reorganization in our 
representations and computations. This takes us 
to CI, SM, MERGE and the interfaces.
Given the modularity of the songbird system, 
and the lack of imitative capacities in non-human 
primates, we also need an account of how a motor 
system capable of imitating sounds and actions 
evolved.  This is an account of how SM evolved, 
but also, about how and when SM interfaced 
with CI and MERGE. There is virtually no 
evidence on offer, and it is hard to imagine what 
kind of evidence could emerge. For example, the 
suggestion that Neanderthals had a hyoid bone 
like Hss is interesting, but doesn’t tell us what 
they were doing with it, whether it was capable 
of being deployed in vocal imitation, and thus, 
of building up the lexicon.  And of course, we 
don’t know whether or how it was connected 
to CI or MERGE. But whatever we discover 
about this account, it showcases the importance 
of understanding the evolution of at least one 
unique property of SM.
When we turn to CI, and in particular, lexical 
or conceptual atoms, we know extremely little 
about them, even in fully linguistics human 
adults.  Needless to say, this makes comparative 
and developmental work difficult. But one 
observation seems fairly uncontroversial: many 
of our concepts are completely detached from 
sensory experiences, and thus can’t be defined 
by them. If we take this as a starting point, we 
can ask: do animals have anything remotely 
like this?  On one reading of Randy Gallistel’s 
elegant work, the answer is “Yes”. All of the 
empirical work on number, time and space 
in animals suggests that such concepts are 
either not linked to or defined by a particular 
modality, or minimally, can be expressed in 
multiple modalities.  Similarly, there is evidence 
that animals are capable of representing some 
sense of identity or sameness that is not tied 
to a modality.  If this is right, and even if these 
concepts are not as abstract as ours, they suggest 
a potential comparative approach that at this 
point, seems closed off for our recursive capacity. 
Having a comparative evolutionary landscape 
of inquiry not only aids in our analyses, it also 
raises a challenge to premises 4 and 5, as well 
as to Richard Lewontin’s comment (supported 
by Berwick and Chomsky) that we can’t study 
or understand the evolution of cognition. Let me 
take a small detour to describe a gorgeous series 
of studies on the evolution of cognition to show 
what can and has been done, and then return to 
premises 4 and 5.
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In most monogamous species, the male and 
female share the same home range or territory. 
In polygynous species, in contrast, there are 
several females associated with one male, and 
thus, the male’s home range area encompasses 
all of the smaller female home ranges.  Based 
on this observation, Steve Gaulin and his 
colleagues (Gaulin & Wartell, 1990; Jacobs, 
Gaulin, Sherry, & Hoffman, 1990; Puts, Gaulin, 
& Breedlove, 2007) predicted that the spatial 
abilities of a monogamous vole would show 
no sex differences, whereas males would show 
greater abilities than females in a closely related 
polygynous vole species. Using a maze running 
task to test for spatial capacity, results provided 
strong support for the prediction.  Further, the 
size of the hippocampus —an area of the brain 
known to play an important role in spatial 
navigation— was significantly larger in males 
of the polygynous species when contrasted with 
females, whereas no sex differences were found 
for the monogamous species. This, and several 
other examples, reveal how one can in fact study 
the evolution of cognition. Lewontin is, I believe, 
flatly wrong.
Back to premises 4 and 5. If nonhuman animals 
have abstract, amodal concepts -as some authors 
suggest— then we have a significant line of 
empirical inquiry into the evolution of this system. 
If our concepts are unique —as authors such as 
Berwick and Chomsky believe— then there may 
not be that many empirical options. Perhaps 
Neanderthals have such concepts, perhaps not. 
Either way, the evolutionary timescale is short, 
and the evidence thus far, relatively thin. On 
either account, however, there is the pressing 
need to understand the nature of such concepts 
as they bear on what I believe is the most 
interesting side effect of this discussion, and the 
issues raised in WOU.  In brief, if one concedes 
that what is unique about language, and thus, 
its evolutionary history, is MERGE, CI, SM and 
the interfaces, then a different issue emerges: 
are these four ingredients unique to language 
or part of all aspects of human thought?  Said 
differently, perhaps WOU is really an account 
of how our uniquely human system of thought 
evolved, with language being only one domain 
in terms of its internal and external systems of 
expression. Berwick and Chomsky often refer to 
our Language of Thought, as the core of language, 
and what is our most dominant use of language: 
internal thought. On this view, externalization 
of this system in expressed language is not at 
the core of the evolutionary account.  On the 
one hand, I agree. On the other hand, I think the 
use of the term of Language of Thought or LOT 
has confused the issue because of the multiple 
uses of the word “language.” If the essence of 
the argument in WOU is about the computations 
and representations of thought, with linguistic 
thought being one flavor, then I would suggest 
we call this system the Logic of Thought.  I suggest 
this substitution of L-words for two reasons. 
Language of Thought implies that the system 
is explicitly linguistic, and I don’t believe it is. 
Further, I think Logic of Thought better captures 
the abstract nature of the ingredients, including 
both the recursive operations, concepts, motor 
routines, and interfaces. 
The Logic of Thought, I would argue, is 
uniquely human, and underpins not only 
language, but many other domains as well.  It 
explains, I believe, why actions that appear 
similar in other animals are actually not similar 
at all.  It also provides the ultimate challenge 
to Darwin’s argument that there is continuity 
in mental thought between humans and 
other animals, with differences attributable to 
quantity as opposed to quality.  In contrast, if 
the ideas discussed here, and ultimately raised 
by Berwick and Chomsky are right, then it is the 
Logic of Thought that is unique to humans.  The 
Logic of Thought includes all four ingredients: 
MERGE, CI, SM, and the interfaces. How these 
components are articulated in different domains 
is fascinating in its own right, and raises several 
additional puzzles. For example, if MERGE 
is the simplest recursive operation, is it one 
neural mechanism that interfaces with different, 
domain-specific concepts and actions, or were 
merge like circuits effectively cloned repeatedly, 
each subserving a different domain?  The first 
possibility suggests that damage to this singular 
MERGE circuit would reveal deficits in multiple 
domains. The second option suggests that 
damage to the MERGE circuit in one domain 
would only reveal deficits in this domain. 
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To my knowledge, there is no evidence of 
neuropsychological deficits or imaging studies 
that point to the nature or distribution of such 
recursive circuitry. 
In sum, WOU is really a terrific book. It is 
thought provoking and clear.  What more could 
you want?  My central challenge is that it paints 
an evolutionary account that can only work if 
the essence of language is simple, restricted to 
MERGE.  But language is much more than this. 
As such, there has to be more to the evolutionary 
process.  By raising these issues, I believe Berwick 
and Chomsky have challenged us to think about 
another option, one that preserves their title, but 
focuses on the logic of thought. Why only us? 
Much to think about.
Marc Hauser
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